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RESPONDING TO THE CELEBRATION:
THE INSCRUTABLE
CONSTITUTION
MICHAEL K. MCCHRYSTAL*
Incongruities attend all meaningful discussion of the Con-
stitution. The articles in this Symposium are rich with incon-
gruities, as they offer important points about this document
that we so fervently debate and in which we invest such hope.
The Constitution carries an enormous burden, for in it differ-
ent people see different and conflicting visions of a better fu-
ture. So much of our national hope is bound up in the
Constitution that incongruities must result, for we are a di-
verse people driven by diverse motives to sometimes diverse
goals.
In these pages, Gordon Baldwin describes a Constitution
laden with "ambiguities which invite interpretation"' and, at
least in separation of powers cases, which receive interpreta-
tions that are "delphic, ambiguous, and seldom supply pre-
dictable doctrine."' 2  In these same pages, Edwin Meese
describes this same Constitution as a "document of fixed
meaning' ' containing "explicit rules." 4 To Betty Southard
Murphy, the Constitution most centrally involves "the protec-
tion of individual economic rights and the encouragement of
materialism," 5 while Christine Wiseman sees a "shift away
from the focus on individual property."' 6 Perhaps the incon-
gruity reaches its peak, however, in Jonathan Van Patten's ef-
fort to show that Attorney General Meese is less an
* Associate Professor of Law, Marquette University Law School.
1. Baldwin, Celebrating the Constitution: The Virtue of Its Vices and Vice Versa, 70
MARQ. L. REv. 423, 430 (1987).
2. Id. at 429.
3. Meese, Our Constitution's Design: The Implications for Its Interpretation, 70
MARQ. L. REV. 381, 382 (1987).
4. Id. at 383.
5. Murphy, Economic Liberty: An Exploration of the Link Between the Constitution
of the United States, Materialism and Basic Freedom, 70 MARQ. L. REv. 901, 902
(1987).
6. Wiseman, A Critical Response to the Interpretivist Constitutional Theories of
Meese and Thurmond, 70 MARQ. L. REv. 475, 481 (1987).
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interpretivist than he claims, and that Justice William Bren-
nan is more an interpretivist than he claims.7
The incongruities implicit in the Constitution are ines-
capable. With respect to interpretivism and the role of the
Framers' intent, certain facts preclude our wholesale adoption
or rejection of such notions. As Professor Van Patten points
out,8 some provisions of the Constitution were debated at
length and may have been adopted with clear intent as to their
meaning; however, other language was not thoroughly de-
bated and its intended meaning is much less clear.9 Moreover,
as Professor Wiseman suggests, it is not clear that the Framers
envisioned that their intent should govern the interpretation
of the Constitution.10 And even if the framers did mean for
their intent to be part of the document, would that justify an
abhorrent decision that members of the Supreme Court could
thereafter personally disclaim? Are members of the Court
free to reach grotesquely unjust results if their historical re-
search convinces them that the Framers would have reached
those same results?
Justice Thurgood Marshall reminds us that the Constitu-
tion was framed by white men who, while enlightened in
many ways, were sadly ignorant in many ways as well. ' This
is no indictment of the Framers: we cannot fairly judge the
worth of eighteenth century persons by twentieth century
standards. But there is a corollary here as well: we cannot
7. Van Patten, The Consequences of Ideology: Constitutional Interpretation Accord-
ing to Original Intention and Contemporary Ratification, 70 MARQ. L. REV. 388, 389
(1987).
8. Id. at 393.
9. George Kennan, the diplomat and historian, described the challenge of recon-
structing historical events in this way:
And to accomplish this task what does he have to draw upon? Only what he
already has within him: his knowledge, of course, of the historical background,
his level of cultural sensitivity, his ability to put the isolated bit of evidence into
the larger context and, above all, his capacity for insight and empathy, his ability
to identify with the historical figures he describes, his educated instinct for what
is significant and what is not - in other words, his creative imagination.
Kennan, History, Literature and the Road to Peterhof, N.Y. Times, June 29, 1986, § 7
(Book Review), at 42.
10. Wiseman, supra note 6, at 478; See also Powell, The Original Understanding of
Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. REV. 885 (1985).
11. Taylor, Marshall Sounds Critical Note on Bicentennial, N.Y. Times, May 7,
1987, at 1, col. 4.
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wisely place sole trust in eighteenth century ideas, reached
through political give-and-take, to solve twentieth century
problems. Perhaps the Framers knew this too, in drafting a
document filled with powerful words that trigger memories,
stir emotions, and conjure images of justice and tyranny. The
words of the Constitution pack a wallop that cannot be ab-
sorbed comfortably by any interpretive theory.
Whether they intended it or not, the Framers devised a
document that has produced a three ring circus of decision-
making. One ring consists of learned journals such as this re-
view in which constitutional theory is debated, often with
both great heat and light. In these learned journals, constitu-
tional issues are raised and joined, and constitutional agendas
are set. Very fine minds are devoted to these tasks, and it is
exceedingly rare for important constitutional questions to
arise or be decided without being first explored in learned
journals. Once constitutional questions are decided, the pages
of these journals fairly ring with criticism, excited or mea-
sured, hopeful or despairing, sweeping or technical. The ex-
pected onslaught of learned criticism sets a very high
professional standard for addressing constitutional questions.
A second ring exists in addition to the professional de-
bates. It operates in corner taverns and in the newspapers, in
the workplace and on the street, wherever people perceive that
law, and especially constitutional law, has an impact on their
lives. And what scholar would deny the importance of public
opinion? Many of the greatest issues of the day are constitu-
tional in substantial part: school busing, law enforcement,
capital punishment, school prayer, abortion, affirmative ac-
tion. The list is long, and it is an emotional and political
minefield. These issues are publicly debated every day, and
access to the debate is granted to all who seek it. The public's
intense involvement in constitutional problems requires that
scholarly theory be tempered by practicality.
And in the center ring sit the courts, buffeted by the action
in the journals and on the streets, but bound to apply the rule
of law. In constitutional cases, the advice offered the courts is
chastening. The Attorney General of the United States ad-
vises them that they may be interpretivists and treat the Con-
stitution as a "document of fixed and legally binding
meaning," or they may be non-interpretivists and treat it as
1987/]
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merely a "starting point for philosophical adventurism."' 12
This is the stark choice expressed by Attorney General Meese
- a polarizing choice.
Attorney General Meese draws a false dichotomy. As
Professor Van Patten points Out, 13 the meaning of some con-
stitutional provisions cannot be fixed by the Framers' intent
because there is inadequate evidence of that intent. Moreover,
Professor Van Patten convincingly shows that not even Attor-
ney General Meese can steadily walk the narrow interpretivist
line that he exhorts the Court to follow unanimously.
In a recent interview, Justice Brennan described the work
of the Court in personal terms rather than the more theoreti-
cal terms that preoccupy commentators.14 His comments un-
derscore the fallacy in addressing constitutional decision-
making in starkly theoretical terms, whether those terms are
interpretivist, non-interpretivist, or something in between.
Justice Brennan emphasized that with only nine members
of the Court, the personalities of the justices play an impor-
tant role. 15 In deciding cases, the immediate objective is to
form a Court, that is, to secure agreement among a majority
of the justices, also called the "massing" of a point of view on
the Court.16 This task is made more difficult because of the
intellectual strength and independence of members of the
Court and because of the importance of diversity on the Court
in respect to race, sex, religion, ethnicity, and geography. The
Court is constituted to see with many eyes and speak with
many voices, but in a given case, a majority of the Court must
speak with a single voice if the job is to be done properly.
And yet, even with Justice Brennan's emphasis on the per-
sonal dimensions of constitutional decision-making, he some-
times speaks of his job in doctrinal terms. Consider these two
comments:
[T]here come issues that no matter what may be the popular,
or the Administration's or anyone else's view, in conscience
you find that you can't resolve the issue in that way. The
12. Meese, supra note 3, at 382.
13. Van Patten, supra note 7, at 393. See also Kaufman, What Did the Founding
Fathers Intend?, N.Y. Times, Feb. 23, 1986, § 6 (Magazine), at 42.
14. Leeds, .4 Life on the Court, N.Y. Times, Oct. 5, 1986, § 6 (Magazine), at 24.
15. Id. at 74.
16. Id. at 74-76.
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Constitution requires a different resolution, and that is
pretty obvious to you. 17
And I had settled in my mind that I had an obligation under
the Constitution which could not be influenced by any of my
religious principles. As a Roman Catholic I might do as a
private citizen what a Roman Catholic does, and that is one
thing, but to the extent that that conflicts with what I think
the Constitution means or requires, then my religious beliefs
have to give way.18
And so, doctrine and theory have a central place, but so too
does the requirement of forming a Court in a given case. The
incongruity is inescapably there. Constitutional decisions will
not be reached by formula, nor have the Framers provided
unmistakably and wisely the outcome for each case. But
neither may the Court do solely as it pleases. It is far more
complex than that.
Constitutional theory, the practicalities of the age, and the
individual temperaments and visions of each justice of the
Court simultaneously exert their powerful forces. Each has its
important say. In the three ring circus of constitutional deci-
sion-making, we are frequently dismayed to find the focus
shift away from what we personally see to be the point. How-
ever, no single focus adequately captures significant constitu-
tional problems, and this may ensure the eternal interest and
frustration of constitutional theorists.
The articles in this Symposium demonstrate extensive dis-
agreement on particular constitutional points and the outright
rejection of some constitutional theories. At times, the Con-
stitution seems more like a boxing ring than a circus ring. But
the analogy to a ring is the central point: the Constitution
confines us to the same vocabulary, the same set of powerful
words, such as due process, establishment of religion, inter-
state commerce, and equal protection. We as a people exhibit
a remarkable willingness to discuss our most profound na-
tional problems in the words of the Constitution. Moreover,
our Constitution possesses a remarkable ability to shed light
on those problems because of the words it contains.
17. Id. at 78.
18. Id. at 79.
1987]

COMMENTS
THE PSYCHIATRIC EXPERT IN THE
CRIMINAL TRIAL: ARE
BIFURCATION AND THE RULES
CONCERNING OPINION
TESTIMONY ON ULTIMATE ISSUES
CONSTITUTIONALLY COMPATIBLE?
INTRODUCTION
Evidentiary rules and court decisions have attempted to
rationalize and crystalize legal issues. The desire to minimize
confusion and further justice has been the impetus to these
endeavors. One confusion-causing factor has been the use of
psychiatric expert testimony in the criminal trial. Courts and
legislatures have raised doubts concerning the scientific valid-
ity of psychiatry. Evidentiary rules and court decisions have
therefore imposed restrictions upon the admissibility of psy-
chiatric expert testimony. The difficulty arises when specific
intent and insanity are key issues in a criminal trial. Each
issue deals with a state of mind or a mental purpose, and psy-
chiatry is the science that deals most closely with these issues.
This Comment deals chiefly with specific intent crimes. It
will be helpful to keep an example in mind while reading.
Wisconsin defines first-degree murder as an act in which one
"causes the death of another human being.with intent to kill
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that person or another."' Intent to kill means the "mental
purpose to take the life of another human being."2
The basic scope of this Comment is the bifurcated trial
system and the use of a psychiatrist's opinion on ultimate is-
sues within that system. There is a discussion of Federal Rule
of Evidence 7043 and state statutes and case law which emu-
late its recent revision. The Comment also addresses the con-
stitutionality of bifurcation, psychiatric expert opinion
testimony, and the operational nexus between these concepts.
The Comment concludes with some proposals that attempt to
alleviate confusion and make their function more constitution-
ally acceptable.
The aim of this Comment is not to delve deeply into the
present state of the insanity defense nor to discuss the various
theories on insanity. Its chief goal is to provide some insight
into the procedural and evidentiary devices which surround
the bifurcated trial and highlight the value of psychiatric ex-
pert testimony.
I. THE BIFURCATED TRIAL SYSTEM
It has been stated that "[b]ifurcation is nothing more than
a procedural device, analytically a pure form without substan-
tive impact and value free in terms of whether it is 'pro prose-
cution' or 'pro defense.' "I The United States Supreme Court
has noted that two-part jury trials are uncommon in federal
jurisprudence being neither constitutionally nor procedurally
1. Wis. STAT. § 940.01(1) (1985-86). Section 940.01(1) provides as follows:
"Whoever causes the death of another human being with intent to kill that person or
another is guilty of a Class A felony." Id. A "Class A" felony carries a penalty of life
imprisonment. See Wis. STAT. § 939.50(3)(a) (1985-86). In contrast, the Model Penal
Code defines murder as follows: "[Criminal homicide constitutes murder when: (a) it
is committed purposely or knowingly; or (b) it is committed recklessly under circum-
stances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life .... MODEL PE-
NAL CODE § 210.2(1) (1962).
2. Wis. STAT. § 940.01(2) (1985-86). Section 940.01(2) provides: "In this chapter
'intent to kill' means the mental purpose to take the life of another human being." Id.
See generally MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 (1962). Section 2.02 of the Model Penal
Code defines "purposefully," "knowingly" and "recklessly" as they are used in relation
to culpability.
3. See infra note 86.
4. Gallivan, Insanity, Bifurcation and Due Process: Can Values Survive Doctrine,
13 LAND & WATER L. REv. 515, 518 (1978).
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